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ABSTRACT 
This article compares the views of Veblen, Dewey and Hayek on the roles and relations 
between instinct, habit and reason. From a Darwinian perspective, it is shown that Veblen had 
a more consistent and developed position on this issue than others. While Dewey embraced 
instinct and especially habit in his early works, these concepts gradually disappeared from 
view. Despite their shared opposition to the rising behaviorist psychology, the works of both 
Dewey and Hayek bear the marks of its hegemony. Consequently, at least in the context 
addressed here, the works of Veblen deserve reconsideration. 
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Instinct and Habit before Reason: 
Comparing the Views of John Dewey, Friedrich Hayek and Thorstein Veblen 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
„But in fact men are good and virtuous because of three things. 
These are nature, habit or training, reason.‟ 
Aristotle, The Politics (1962, p. 284) 
 
 
Among species on Earth, humans have the most developed capacity for reason, deliberation 
and conscious prefiguration.1 However, humans have evolved from other species. Their 
unique attributes have emerged by the gradual accumulation of adaptations. Our capacity for 
reason did not appear as a sudden and miraculous event. Philosophers and social theories have 
long pondered the place of human reason in human behavior and creativity. The facts of 
human evolution have a big impact on such considerations.  
The concepts of instinct, habit and reason are complex, as is the relationship between them. 
Theories involving these concepts typically have many implications, from the causes of 
human action to the nature of social order. The terms instinct and habit both carry some 
unfortunate intellectual baggage. Nevertheless, for convenience I retain the word instinct as a 
tag for biologically inherited dispositions. Habit refers to learned dispositions. Instincts are 
inherited through genes, and habits through culture and institutions. 
This paper considers the work of three leading thinkers in this area, namely Thorstein 
Veblen (1857-1929), John Dewey (1859-1952) and Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992). Charles 
Darwin influenced all three, and Darwinism is a benchmark against which they are compared. 
Although Darwinism profoundly influenced all three thinkers, its impact in psychological 
terms was greatest on Veblen. Veblen was not a behaviorist, and both Dewey and Hayek were 
resolute in their anti-behaviorism. But the works of both Dewey and Hayek reflect the long 
behaviorist hegemony and nadir of Darwinian thinking in psychology from the 1920s to the 
1960s. With the strong revival of Darwinian thinking in both psychology and the social 
sciences, Veblen‟s work requires equal if not greater reconsideration. 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank participants at the Behavioral Research Council conference on „Dewey, Hayek and Embodied 
Cognition: Experience, Beliefs and Rules‟, Great Barrington, Massachusetts, USA on 18-20 July 2003, plus 
anonymous referees for critical comments or discussions. In two footnotes below I criticize my friend Elias 
Khalil‟s interpretations of Veblen and Darwinism. My choice of him as a target for criticism does not imply any 
lack of gratitude to him for organizing such a magnificent conference. It reflects instead his energetic and 
stimulating presence at these proceedings. Some material in this essay, particularly in sections one and two, is 
based on passages from Hodgson (2004a). Section four develops a small amount of material from Hodgson 
(1993). 
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I believe that the social sciences can be reinvigorated by the careful application of 
Darwinian principles. This argument has been developed elsewhere (Hodgson, 2004a; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, forthcoming) and it is not possible to deal with all the 
misunderstandings of Darwinism that lie in the way.2 I confine myself here to the concepts of 
habit, instinct and reason, and the relations between them. 
1. The Darwinian Background 
In much of philosophy and social theory since Classical Antiquity, human belief and reason 
have been placed in the driving seat of individual action. In particular, social theory has often 
taken it for granted, or even by definition, that action is motivated by reasons based on beliefs. 
In contrast, a minority has criticized the adoption of this „folk psychology‟ that explains 
human action wholly in such „mind first‟ terms. Critics point out that such explanations are a 
mere gloss on a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These dualistic and „mind-
first‟ explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as 
sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our 
perceptions or actions (Bunge, 1980; P. M. Churchland, 1984, 1989; P. S. Churchland, 1986; 
Rosenberg, 1995, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000). 
This challenge to orthodoxy derives further impetus from the revision of our view of the 
place of humanity in nature, which followed the publication of Charles Darwin‟s Origin of 
Species in 1859.3 Darwin did not only proclaim that species had evolved, but also pointed to 
the causal mechanisms of evolution. Most fundamentally, and in addition to his discovery of 
the mechanism of natural selection, Darwin insisted that all phenomena – including human 
deliberation – should be susceptible to causal explanation. He extended the realm of causal 
explanation into areas that were deemed taboo by religious doctrine. He rejected explanations 
of natural phenomena in terms of design, to focus instead on the detailed causes that had 
cumulated in the emergence of elaborate phenomena over long periods of time. 
Darwin (1859, p. 167) was aware that his Origin of Species offered far from a complete 
explanation of all aspects of evolution, and expressed a profound ignorance of the 
mechanisms that led to variations in organisms. But he did not believe that variations emerged 
spontaneously, in the sense of being without a cause. Darwin (1859, p. 209) asserted that such 
„accidental variations‟ must be „produced by … unknown causes‟ rather than embracing a 
notion of a spontaneous, uncaused event. 
He believed that relatively simple mechanisms of cause and effect could, given time and 
circumstances, lead to amazingly complex and varied results. He upheld that complicated 
                                                 
2 I mention one only. Khalil (2003b, p. 177) writes: „For natural selection theory, the subject (organism) is 
presented as passive, succeeding or failing in response to the object (the selection force) that is assumed to be 
self-constituted and independent of the subject.‟ This may be true of some versions of Darwinism, but it is not 
true of Darwin himself (who saw organisms as far from passive) and several traditions in Darwinian biology that 
stress strong interactions between organisms and their environment, including cases of frequency dependence 
(where fitness or selection pressure depend on the size of the population), active niche search or niche creation, 
and other instances where organisms choose or change their circumstances. See for example Levins and 
Lewontin (1985), Laland et al. (2000) and Hodgson (1993) for further references. 
3 Richards (1987) provides an extensive and powerful account of the impact of Darwinism on the development 
of the theory of mind. 
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outcomes could be explained in terms of a detailed succession and accumulation of step-by-
step causal mechanisms. This doctrine applied to the most sophisticated and complex 
outcomes of evolution, such as the eye and human consciousness. Accordingly, there were 
neither sudden nor miraculous leaps in the evolution of human intentionality. Like all human 
attributes, they must have been prefigured in the species from which humans are descended. 
In this way the causal origin of these features is liable to explanation. Darwin (1859, p. 208) 
thus wrote: „A little dose … of judgment or reason often comes into play, even in animals 
very low in the scale of nature.‟ 
Thomas Henry Huxley, had similar views concerning causality and the aims of science. For 
Huxley the idea of uncaused and spontaneous event was absurd and unacceptable. Science 
was nothing less than an ongoing endeavor to reveal the causes behind phenomena. Huxley 
(1894, vol. 1, pp. 158-9) opined that the progress of science meant „the extension of the 
province of what we call matter and causation‟. Similarly, George Romanes (1893, p. 402) – a 
friend of Darwin and Huxley – argued that Darwinism 
seeks to bring the phenomena of organic nature into line with those of inorganic; and 
therefore to show that whatever view we may severally take as to the kind of causation 
which is energizing in the latter we must now extend to the former. … the theory of 
evolution by natural selection … endeavours to comprise all the facts of adaptation in 
organic nature under the same category of explanation as those which occur in inorganic 
nature – that is to say, under the category of physical, or ascertainable, causation. 
Darwinism brought not only human evolution, but also the human mind and consciousness 
within the realms of science. An ongoing aim is to explain characteristic aspects of the human 
psyche in terms of natural selection; Darwinism thus brought the frontier of scientific enquiry 
to the inner workings of the human mind (Richards, 1987). 
Darwin accepted that humans were intentional but insisted that intentionality itself was 
caused. Accordingly, there were neither sudden nor miraculous leaps in the evolution of 
human intentionality. Like all human attributes, they must have been prefigured in the species 
from which humans are descended. In this way the causal origin of these features is 
susceptible to explanation. In a paper of 1874, Huxley (1894, vol. 1, pp. 236-7) elaborated and 
generalized Darwin‟s argument as the „doctrine of continuity‟: 
The doctrine of continuity is too well established for it to be permissible to me to suppose 
that any complex natural phenomenon comes into existence suddenly, and without being 
preceded by simpler modifications; and very strong arguments would be needed to prove 
that such complex phenomena as consciousness, first made their appearance in man. We 
know, that, in the individual man, consciousness grows from a dim glimmer to its full 
light, whether we consider the infant advancing in years, or the adult emerging from 
slumber and swoon. We know, further, that the lower animals possess, though less 
developed, that part of the brain which we have every reason to believe to be the organ of 
consciousness in man; … [they] have a consciousness which, more or less distinctly, 
foreshadows our own. 
The growth of human intentionality must be considered not only within the (ontogenetic) 
development of a single individual, as the impulsive infant is transformed into the reasoning 
adult; but also within the (phylogenetic) evolution of the human species, from lower animals 
through social apes, to humans with linguistic and deliberative capacities. 
The doctrine of continuity undermines dualistic presentations of intentional (or final) and 
physical (or efficient) causes, as completely separate and distinct types of cause. However, the 
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Darwinian attack on dualism is sometimes misinterpreted as an attempt to belittle human 
intentionality. On the contrary, the application of Darwinism to theories of mind led to the 
development of emergentist theories, where mental phenomena are seen as emergent 
properties physical relations (Morgan, 1923; Bunge, 1980; Blitz, 1992). 
Such dualism is widely regarded as untenable. Barry Hindess (1989, p. 150) asked 
pertinently: „If human action is subject to two distinct modes of determination, what happens 
when they conflict, when intentionality pushes one way and causality pushes another?‟ We do 
not and cannot know the answer, because to reach it would involve the reconciliation of 
irreconcilables. John Searle (1997, pp. xii-xiii) similarly remarked: „dualism ... seems a 
hopeless theory because, having made a strict distinction between the mental and the physical, 
it cannot make the relation of the two intelligible.‟ Mario Bunge (1980, p. 20) put it in a 
nutshell: „Dualism is inconsistent with the ontology of science.‟ 
The upshot is that human mental propensities have to be explained in evolutionary terms. 
Our intention and reason is framed and impelled by dispositions that we have either inherited 
or acquired. Instincts are inherited behavioral or mental propensities. The behavior of some 
organisms is largely instinctive. Fitter or more adaptive behaviors have an advantage, and the 
associated instincts will be generally favored by natural selection and inherited by succeeding 
generations. 
Long ago, Aristotle (1956, p. 35) noted that „“habit” means a disposition‟ but can also be 
used to denote an activity. Darwin himself used the word in both senses, to refer to behavior, 
or to refer to a learned aptitude or acquired disposition. The meaning of habit is further 
complicated if we presume that acquired characters can be inherited. Darwin (1859, pp. 82, 
137, 209) himself upheld this „Lamarckian‟ proposition. If such Lamarckian inheritance were 
possible, then an acquired disposition might become hereditable and the distinction between 
habit and instinct would become blurred. As Darwin (1859, p. 209) himself claimed, if the 
inheritance of acquired characters occurs, „then the resemblance between what originally was 
a habit and an instinct becomes so close as not to be distinguished.‟ Darwin provided a 
satisfactorily definition of neither habit nor instinct, despite his frequent use of these terms. 
Matters changed shortly after Darwin‟s death in 1882, when August Weismann (1889, 
1893) produced experimental evidence and theoretical arguments to undermine the idea of 
Lamarckian inheritance in biological organisms. Such results prompted Darwinian 
psychologists such as William James (1890) to make a more careful distinction between 
instinct and habit. He criticized Darwin for regarding instincts as accumulated habits. James 
defined instincts as biologically inherited dispositions, and habits as dispositions that were 
acquired or learned. Accordingly, habits are dependent on the particular environment 
experienced by the individual, whereas instincts do not exhibit such a degree of potential 
variability with circumstances. 
James was part of the pragmatist movement in philosophy, which saw habit as coming 
before belief and reason. Charles Sanders Peirce (1878, p. 294) emphasized that the „essence 
of belief is the establishment of habit‟. The pragmatist Josiah Royce (1969, vol. 2, p. 663) 
announced in his 1902 presidential address to the American Psychological Association: „The 
organization of our intelligent conduct is necessarily a matter of habit, not of instantaneous 
insight.‟ In the pragmatist view, habit supports rather than obstructs rational deliberation; 
without habit reason is disempowered (Kilpinen, 1999, 2000). 
Turning to instincts, these are inherited behavioral dispositions that, when triggered, give 
rise to reflexes, urges or emotions. Instincts are not fixed behaviors; they are dispositions that 
can often be suppressed or diverted. There is clear evidence for some human instincts. 
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Newborn babies inherit the means of recognition and imitation of some vocal sounds, as well 
as some elemental understanding of linguistic structure (Pinker, 1994). Although the 
development of language is impossible without extensive social interaction (Brown, 1973), it 
is also impossible without priming instincts. There are also instinctive reflexes to clutch, 
suckle, and much else. 
The Darwinian doctrine of continuity has the following consequences for our understanding 
of instincts and habits. In the evolution of the human species, there was no cause or possibility 
for evolution to dispense with habits and instincts once human reasoning emerged. It built 
upon them, just as human bipedal physiology built upon the modified skeletal topology of a 
quadruped. Earlier structures and processes, having proved their evolutionary success, are 
likely to be built upon rather than removed. Hence earlier evolutionary forms can retain their 
use and presence within the organism. They will do this when they form the building blocks 
of complex further developments. That being the case, we retain instincts and unconscious 
mental processes that can function independently of our conscious reasoning. As some animal 
species developed more complex instincts, they eventually acquired the capacity to register 
fortuitous and reinforced behaviors through the evolution of mechanisms of habituation. In 
turn, upon these mechanisms, humans built culture and language. Our layered mind, with its 
unconscious lower strata, maps our long evolution from less deliberative organisms. 
Consistent with the evolutionary doctrine of continuity, habits and instincts are highly 
functional evolutionary survivals of our pre-human past. 
Just as the evolution of the human species involved the layering of habit upon instinct, and 
deliberation upon habit and instinct, the development of a human infant likewise involves a 
progression from largely instinctive behavior, through behavior that depends more on 
habituation, to behavior guided by reason. But as each higher level emerges, it relies on the 
earlier and more fundamental mechanisms. Habit and instinct remain essential. 
At birth, the removal of all instincts would result in the tragic absurdity of a newborn with 
no guidance in its interaction with the world. Lacking any goal or impulse, it would be 
overwhelmed by sensory stimuli, but with no disposition for selective attention. The infant 
could do little else but engage in a random and directionless search through effectively 
meaningless sensations. If the newborn mind was like a blank slate, then the infant would 
have inadequate means of structuring its interaction with the world or of learning from 
experience, and the slate would remain void. 
Instincts are aroused by circumstances and specific sensory inputs. Particular circumstances 
can trigger inherited instincts such as fear, imitation or sexual arousal. It is beyond the point 
to argue that acquired habit or socialization are much more important than instinct. 
Emphatically, many of our dispositions and much of our personality are formed after birth. 
But the importance of socialization does not deny the necessary role of instinct. Both instinct 
and habit are essential for individual development. Inherited dispositions are necessary for 
socialization to begin its work. Obversely, much instinct can hardly manifest itself without the 
help of culture and socialization. Instinctive behavior and socialization are not always rivals 
but often complements: they interact with one another. The degree to which we are affected 
by our social circumstances is immense, but that is no ground for the banishment of the 
concept of instinct from social theory. 
Habit has both ontogenetic and phylogenetic priority over reason, and instinct has both 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic priority over habit. Furthermore, while the human species 
evolved its capacity to reason, it dependence on instinct and habit did not decline. Darwin 
(1871, vol. 1, p. 37) himself wrote: „Cuvier maintained that instinct and intelligence stand in 
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an inverse ratio to each other; and some have thought that the intellectual facilities of the 
higher animals have been gradually developed from their instincts. But … no such inverse 
ratio really exists.‟ 
In contrast, Émile Durkheim (1984, pp. 262, 284) wrote in 1893 that: „It is indeed proven 
that intelligence and instinct always vary in inverse proportion to each other … the advance of 
consciousness is inversely proportional to that of the instinct.‟ As the social sciences broke 
from biology in the interwar period, this false antithesis between intelligence and instinct 
became commonplace in twentieth century social science. 
Others were much closer to Darwin on this question. For example, the economist John 
Hobson (1914, p. 356) proposed „to break down the abruptness of the contrast between reason 
and instinct and to recognise in reason itself the subtlest play of the creative instinct.‟ 
Similarly, the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1922, p. 30) also emphasised that reason 
„does not supplant instinct‟ and „reason itself is an instinctive disposition … to compare, 
combine, and organize the activities of the mind.‟ As noted below, the position of Veblen was 
also similar to Darwin in this respect. 
2. Thorstein Veblen 
Contrary to some accounts, Veblen did not see human agency as entirely determined by 
culture or institutions. Veblen neither denied nor underestimated the significance of human 
intentionality, but saw it as a result of evolution. He saw intentions as based on habits and 
instincts that were products of social and human evolution. He retained the idea that persons 
were purposeful, but Veblen (1898b, pp. 188-93) placed this proposition within an 
evolutionary framework: 
Like other species, [man] is a creature of habit and propensity. But in a higher degree 
than other species, man mentally digests the content of habits under whose guidance he 
acts, and appreciates the trend of these habits and propensities. ... By selective necessity 
he is endowed with a proclivity for purposeful action. ... He acts under the guidance of 
propensities which have been imposed upon him by the process of selection to which he 
owes his differentiation from other species. 
Hence Veblen followed Darwin and regarded human intentionality as a capacity that had itself 
evolved through natural selection. As Veblen (1899, p. 15) put it in another work, the capacity 
of humankind to act with deliberation towards ends was itself a result of natural selection: 
As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a 
centre of unfolding impulsive activity – „teleological‟ activity. He is an agent seeking in 
every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end. 
Despite this, Veblen is widely misunderstood as underestimating the actuality or significance 
of human intentionality and purposefulness. On the contrary, Veblen (1898a, p. 391) insisted: 
„Economic action is teleological, in the sense that men always and everywhere seek to do 
something.‟ The fact that such purposeful behavior itself emerged through evolutionary 
selection does not mean a denial of the reality of purposeful behavior. Instead, Veblen 
consistently tried to reconcile a notion of individual purposefulness (or sufficient reason) with 
his materialist idea of causality (or efficient cause). 
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Like Darwin, Huxley and others, Veblen rejected a dualist or Cartesian ontology that 
separated intentionality completely from matter and materialist causality. Veblen (1909, pp. 
624-5) saw such a dualism as unacceptable for the following reason: 
The two methods of inference – from sufficient reason [or intention] and from efficient 
[or materialist] cause – are out of touch with one another and there is no transition from 
one to the other: no method of converting the procedure or the results of the one into 
those of the other.  
Following Darwin, Veblen placed human intentionality in an evolutionary context. At least in 
principle, consciousness had to be explained in Darwinian and evolutionary terms. As Veblen 
(1906, p. 589) put it: „While knowledge is construed in teleological terms, in terms of 
personal interest and attention, this teleological aptitude is itself reducible to a product of 
unteleological natural selection.‟ Veblen (1909, p. 625) similarly acknowledged „that the 
relation of sufficient reason enters very substantially into human conduct. It is this element of 
discriminating forethought that distinguishes human conduct from brute behavior.‟ Veblen 
(1909, p. 626) then went on to regard „the relation of sufficient reason as a proximate, 
supplementary, or intermediate ground, subsidiary, and subservient to the argument from 
cause to effect.‟ 
In sum, while human intentionality is real and consequential, and a necessary element in 
any causal explanation in the social sciences, intentions themselves had at some time to be 
explained. As Veblen (1909, p. 626) put it, explanation could not be confined to the 
„rationalistic, teleological terms of calculation and choice‟ because the psychological beliefs 
and mechanisms that lay behind deliberation and preferences had also to be explained in 
terms of a „sequence of cause and effect, by force of such elements as habituation and 
conventional requirements.‟ By acknowledging the need for such causal explanations, Veblen 
rejected both the assumption of the given individual in neoclassical economics and the 
opposite error of regarding human agency as entirely an outcome of mysterious social forces. 
Veblen inherited principally from James (1890) an emphasis on the role of both habit and 
instinct in human thought and action.4 In his Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen articulated a 
relationship between human biological instincts and socio-economic evolution. The 
Darwinian imperative of survival means than the human individual has particular traits, the 
most „ancient and ingrained‟ of which are „those habits that touch on his existence as an 
organism‟ (Veblen, 1899, p. 107). In addition: „With the exception of the instinct of self-
preservation, the propensity for emulation is probably the strongest and most alert and 
persistent of the economic motives proper‟ (p. 110). On such assumptions concerning human 
nature, Veblen (1899) built his account of the process of status emulation in modern society. 
Veblen‟s most extensive treatment of the concepts of instinct and habit is in his Instinct of 
Workmanship. There Veblen (1914, pp. 2-3) argued that an „inquiry into institutions will 
address itself to the growth of habits and conventions, as conditioned by the material 
environment and by the innate and persistent propensities of human nature‟. He continued: 
„for these propensities, as they take effect in the give and take of cultural growth, no better 
designation than the time-worn „instinct‟ is available.‟ Veblen (1914, p. 13) upheld that 
„instincts are hereditary traits.‟ Throughout his writings, Veblen generally saw instinct as an 
                                                 
4 Elsewhere, however, I consider some cases where Veblen over-extended the explanatory role of instinct in the 
social domain (Hodgson, 2004a). 
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„innate and persistent‟ propensity. He distinguished it from habit, which is a propensity that is 
molded by environmental circumstances.  
However, for Veblen, instincts were not mere impulses. All instincts involve intelligence, 
and the manifestation of many instincts means the presence of an intention behind the act. As 
Veblen (1914, pp. 3, 32) insisted: „Instinctive action is teleological, consciously so … All 
instinctive action is intelligent and teleological.‟ He regarded instincts as consciously directed 
towards ends and as part of the apparatus of reason. Veblen (1914, pp. 5-6) wrote: 
The ends of life, then, the purposes to be achieved, are assigned by man‟s instinctive 
proclivities; but the ways and means of accomplishing those things which the instinctive 
proclivities so make worth while are a matter of intelligence. It is a distinctive mark of 
mankind that the working-out of the instinctive proclivities of the race is guided by 
intelligence to a degree not approached by other animals. But the dependence of the race 
on its endowment of instincts is no less absolute for this intervention of intelligence; 
since it is only by the prompting of instinct that reflection and deliberation come to be so 
employed, and since instinct also governs the scope and method of intelligence in all this 
employment of it. 
However, some of Veblen‟s formulations on instinct have caused confusion. On the one hand, 
Veblen (1914, pp. 2-3, 13) stated that instincts were „innate and persistent … propensities‟ 
and „hereditary traits.‟ On the other hand, a few pages later, Veblen (p. 38) wrote that: „All 
instinctive behavior is subject to development and hence to modification by habit.‟ Several 
authors have seized on this latter sentence as evidence that by instinct Veblen did not mean 
fixed and inherited dispositions. Instead, he here seemed to suggest that an individual‟s 
instincts could be altered by individual‟s development and environment. This would seem to 
contradict the earlier statement in the same work that instincts were „innate and persistent‟. 
But the contradiction disappears when it is realized that in the first passage (pp. 2-3) Veblen 
refers to „instinct‟ and in the latter (p. 38) he refers to „instinctive behavior‟. The instincts of 
an individual cannot be changed; but „instinctive behavior‟ can. Behavior promoted by 
instincts can be modified or repressed, through constraints, countervailing habits or will. The 
sexual instinct, for example, is biologically inherited and innate, but can take a variety of 
behavioral forms, depending on cultural and other influences. There is no passage in Veblen‟s 
writing that shows unambiguously that he departed from the idea that instincts were „innate 
and persistent … hereditary traits‟. 
Veblen retained a necessary place for both instinct and habit – nature and nurture – in his 
explanation of human behavior. Human deliberation and habits of thought are shaped by the 
social culture. But „it is only by the prompting of instinct‟ that human cognition and 
deliberation come into play. Instincts help to spur emotions that drive many of our actions and 
deliberations. Veblen saw instincts as not only the basis of human purposes and preferences, 
but also as the primary drives and prompts of intelligent deliberation and action. Instincts 
focus activity on specific ends, and help to shape the means of their pursuit. Inherited nature 
is necessary for nurture to function. Nature and nurture are not rivals but complements. 
But if instinct can bear such a burden, what is to stop natural selection eventually creating 
sophisticatedly programmed instincts that are sufficiently flexible to deal with most 
circumstances? If instincts are so powerful, why do they not evolve to provide the complete 
apparatus of human cognition and action? If this happened, then no major role would be left 
for habits, as instincts would be sufficient for survival. In addressing these important 
questions, Veblen (1914, p. 6) argued that instincts on their own were too blunt or vague as 
instruments to deal with the more rapidly evolving exigencies of the human condition. Habits, 
 - 9 - 
being more adaptable than instincts, are necessary to deal with „the larger body of knowledge 
in any given community‟ and the „elaborate … ways and means interposed between these 
impulses and their realisation‟. With intelligent organisms dealing with complex 
circumstances, instincts remain vital, but the modificatory power of habits becomes relatively 
more important. The social and natural environment is too inconstant to allow the natural 
selection of sufficiently complex and refined instincts to take place. Habits are acquired, 
additional and necessary means for instinctive proclivities to be pursued in a changing social 
and natural environment. As Veblen (pp. 6-7) put it:  
The apparatus of ways and means available for the pursuit of whatever may be worth 
seeking is, substantially all, a matter of tradition out of the past, a legacy of habits of 
thought accumulated through the experience of past generations. So that the manner, and 
in a great degree the measure, in which the instinctive ends of life are worked out under 
any given cultural situation is somewhat closely conditioned by these elements of habit, 
which so fall into shape as an accepted scheme of life. The instinctive proclivities are 
essentially simple and look directly to the attainment of some concrete objective end; but 
in detail the ends so sought are many and diverse, and the ways and means by which they 
may be sought are similarly diverse and various, involving endless recourse to 
expedients, adaptations, and concessive adjustment between several proclivities … 
Instincts are „essentially simple‟ and directed to „some concrete objective end‟. Habits are the 
means by which the pursuit of these ends could be adapted in particular circumstances. In 
comparison to instinct, habit is a relatively flexible means of adapting to complexity, 
disturbance and unpredictable change. 
Veblen saw habits, like instincts, as essential for conscious deliberation. Habit is not 
opposed to reason but part of the act of deliberation itself. In turn, the habit-driven capacity to 
reason and reflect upon the situation could give rise to new behaviors and new habits. Habits 
and reason can interact with one another in an ongoing process of adaptation to a changing 
environment. This capacity to form new habits, aided by both instincts and reason, has helped 
to enhance the fitness of the human species in the process of natural selection. 
Veblen explained how processes of habituation give rise to „proximate ends‟ in addition to 
any „ulterior purpose‟ driven by instinct. He gave the example of the habit of money 
acquisition in a pecuniary culture. Money – a means – becomes an end in itself; and the 
pursuit of money becomes a cultural norm. But pecuniary motives are not innate to 
humankind: they are culturally formed. Veblen (1914, p. 7) then began to elaborate how 
habits, acquired anew by each individual, could in effect be transmitted from generation to 
generation, without any assumption of acquired character inheritance at the individual level: 
Under the discipline of habituation this logic and apparatus of ways and means falls into 
conventional lines, acquires the consistency of custom and prescription, and so takes on 
an institutional character and force. The accustomed ways of doing and thinking not only 
become an habitual matter of course … but they come likewise to be sanctioned by social 
convention, and so become right and proper and give rise to principles of conduct. By use 
and wont they are incorporated into the current scheme of common sense. 
Veblen (1899, p. 246) had written earlier that „the scheme of life, of conventions, acts 
selectively and by education to shape the human material‟. Similarly, Veblen (1914, pp. 38-9) 
explained that „the habitual acquirements of the race are handed on from one generation to the 
next, by tradition, training, education, or whatever general term may best designate that 
discipline of habituation by which the young acquire what the old have learned.‟ He saw 
conventions, customs and institutions as repositories of social knowledge. Institutional 
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adaptations and behavioral norms were stored in individual habits and could be passed on by 
education or imitation to succeeding generations. He thus acknowledged processes of „dual 
inheritance‟ or „coevolution‟ (to use modern terms) where there was evolution at both the 
instinctive and the cultural levels, with their different means of transmission through time.5 
Hence Veblen did not take habits or instincts as given but placed them within an 
evolutionary framework, where natural selection acted on human instincts and – at a faster 
rate – habits were themselves selected in a changing environment. Veblen (1899, p. 188) thus 
wrote of the „natural selection of the fittest habits of thought‟ involving an interaction 
between „individuals‟ and „changing institutions‟ which were „themselves the result of a 
selective and adaptive process‟. 
Veblen (1914, p. 39) wrote: „handed on by the same discipline of habituation, goes a 
cumulative body of knowledge.‟ Veblen (p. 53) also emphasized that habits were the 
mechanisms through which the individual was able to perceive and understand the world: „All 
facts of observation are necessarily seen in the light of the observer‟s habits of thought‟. In 
other words, habits of thought are essential to cognition. Habits are acquired through 
socialization and provide a mechanism by which institutional norms and conventions are 
pressed upon the individual (Hodgson, 2003, 2004a; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). 
But Veblen was not a behaviorist. Veblen (1900, pp. 246-7) noted the „modern catchword‟ 
of „response to stimulus‟ but pointed out that „the reaction to stimulus‟ is conditioned also by 
„the constitution of the organism‟ which „in greater part decides what will serve as a stimulus, 
as well as what the manner and direction of the response will be.‟ This passage clearly 
demarcates Veblen from behaviorist psychology, where the stimulus itself is seen as sufficient 
to condition a response. In contrast, Veblen saw the human agent as discretionary, with „a 
self-directing and selective attention in meeting the complex of forces that make up its 
environment.‟ For Veblen, as with James, part of this discretionary and selective capacity was 
molded by habits and instincts. 
From the acquisition of language to elemental acts of imitation and socialization, the 
primary thoughts and behaviors that begin to form habits require instinctive impulses for their 
initialization. These instincts and habits power our emotional drives. We are riven with 
dispositions and preconceptions: some inherited, some acquired. These dispositions and 
preconceptions do not entirely determine our thoughts and actions, but they create the reactive 
mechanisms leading to possible behavioral outcomes. 
Veblen emphasized the double weight of the past on human deliberation and decision-
making. First, the natural selection of instincts over hundreds of thousands of years has 
provided humans with a set of basic dispositions, albeit with substantial „variations of 
individuality‟ (Veblen, 1914, p. 13) from person to person. The newborn infant comes into the 
world with these fixed and inherited propensities. But, second, the world of the child is one of 
specific customs and institutions into which he or she must be socialized. The individual 
learns to adapt to these circumstances, and through repeated action acquires culturally specific 
habits of thought and behavior. These customs and institutions have also evolved through 
time; they are the weight of the past at the social level. The weight of instinct results from the 
phylogenetic evolution of the human population. Habituation is the mechanism through which 
                                                 
5 See Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Durham (1991). 
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the weight of social institutions can make its mark on the ontogenetic development of each 
individual.6 
In Veblen‟s writings, the term „habit‟ suggests a propensity or disposition, not behaviour as 
such. Veblen often coupled the words „habit and propensity‟ or „propensities and habits‟ 
together. Looking at the context here, Veblen meant that habit is also a propensity, alongside 
other propensities, such as instincts. But perhaps the most decisive passages on this question 
are the following. Veblen (1898a, p. 390) wrote of „a coherent structure of propensities and 
habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity‟. Here habit is tied in 
with other propensities and „seeks realization‟, suggesting that habit itself is a disposition, 
rather than behaviour. Even more clearly, Veblen (1898b, p. 188) remarked that „man 
mentally digests the content of habits under whose guidance he acts, and appreciates the trend 
of these habits and propensities.‟ Here habits are not actions, but the dispositions that guide 
them. 
Veblen‟s usage was consistent with the pragmatist philosophers and instinct psychologists, 
who saw habit as an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may or may not be actually 
expressed in current behavior. Repeated behavior is important in establishing a habit. But 
habit and behavior are not the same. If we acquire a habit we do not necessarily use it all the 
time. It is a propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations. 
Many thinkers have difficulty accepting the idea of habit as a disposition. They prefer to 
define habit as behavior. A source of the problem is a reluctance to remove reason and belief 
from the driving seat of human action. The „mind-first‟ conception of action pervades social 
science. If habits affect behavior then it is wrongly feared that reason and belief will be 
dethroned. However, from a pragmatist perspective, reasons and beliefs themselves depend 
upon habits of thought. Habits act as filters of experience and the foundations of intuition and 
interpretation. Habit is the grounding of both reflective and non-reflective behavior. But this 
does not make belief, reason or will any less important or real. 
Veblen adopted a pragmatist theory of action in which activity and habit formation precede 
rational deliberation. For the pragmatist, activity itself does not require reason or deliberation; 
we only have to consider the habitual or instinctive behavior of non-human animals to 
establish this truth. According to the Darwinian principle of continuity, but contrary to much 
of twentieth century social science, the uniqueness of humanity does not lie in any relegation 
of instinct or habit, but in the critical supplementary deployment of conscious rational 
deliberation when a striking problem or novel situation demands it. Reasons and intentions 
emerge in continuous process of interaction with the world, while we are always driven by 
habits and other dispositions. As Veblen (1919, p. 15) explained: 
                                                 
6 As a representative critic, Khalil (1995, pp. 555-6) asserted: „Inspired by Veblen‟s legacy, old institutional 
economists generally tend to view the preferences of agents as, in the final analysis, determined by cultural 
norms.‟ This may be true of some old institutionalists, but it was not true of Veblen (1909, p. 629) who insisted 
that social science must „formulate its theoretical results in terms of individual conduct‟. From an evolutionary 
perspective, as Veblen understood well, there is no „final analysis‟. Despite its subtitle, Khalil‟s (1995) article is 
essentially about neither Veblen nor his true legacy, but about versions of institutionalism that became prominent 
in America after Veblen‟s death. Neither do I accept Khalil‟s (2003a, p. 117; 2003b, p. 170) characterization of 
Veblen‟s (and my own) position as „normative‟ and „self-actional‟ in the sense that Veblen (or myself) made no 
attempt to explain the origin of behavioral drives, thus treating them as „immanently conceived‟. The whole 
point of the evolutionary approach adopted by Veblen is to explain the origins as well as the effects of instinctive 
and habitual drives. Khalil wrongly lumps Veblen with those sociologists who have made norms or structures do 
most of the explanatory work. 
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History teaches that men, taken collectively, learn by habituation rather than precept 
and reflection; particularly as touches those underlying principles of truth and validity 
on which the effectual scheme of law and custom finally rests. 
Reason is intimately connected with doing, because activity is the stimulus for habits of 
thought, and because reason and intelligence are deployed to guide action through problems 
and difficulties. Intelligence is „the selective effect of inhibitive complication‟ (Veblen, 1906, 
p. 589). In less cryptic words, deliberation and reason are deployed to make a choice when 
habits conflict, or are insufficient to deal with the complex situation. In turn, these particular 
patterns of reason and deliberation themselves begin to become habituated, so that when we 
face a similar situation again, we may have learned to deal with more effectively. Reason does 
not and cannot overturn habit; it must make use of it to form new habits. Veblen (1906, p. 
588) wrote that „knowledge is inchoate action inchoately directed to an end; that all 
knowledge is “functional”; that it is of the nature of use.‟ Knowledge is an adaptation to a 
problem situation; it stems from and assists activity (Daugert, 1950, pp. 35-6). 
Instinct is prior to habit, habit is prior to belief, and belief is prior to reason. That is the 
order in which they have evolved in our human ancestry over millions of years. That too is the 
order in which they appear in the ontogenetic development of each human individual. The 
capacity for belief and reason develops on a foundation of acquired instinctive and habitual 
dispositions. That too is the order in which they are arranged in a hierarchy of functional 
dependence, where the current operation of reason depends upon belief, belief depends upon 
habit, and habit depends upon instinct. Lower elements in the hierarchy do not entirely 
determine the higher functions, but they impel them into their being, where they are formed in 
their respective natural and social context. The lower elements are necessary but not sufficient 
for the higher. 
Accordingly, Veblen (1914, p. 30 n.) recognized „that intellectual functions themselves take 
effect only on the initiative of the instinctive dispositions and under their surveillance‟. By 
adopting this view, the false „antithesis between instinct and intelligence will consequently 
fall away.‟ Veblen saw Darwinism as implying that habit and instinct were the basis of 
motivation; they impelled and dominated any rational calculation of individual interests or 
objectives. 
3. John Dewey 
Veblen, Dewey, James and Peirce were a group of American intellectuals profoundly 
influenced by Darwinism, although their interpretations and uses of this doctrine differ in 
some respects (Wiener, 1949). Dewey moved from his earlier Hegelian idealism to become a 
leading philosopher of pragmatism. 
Like James and Veblen, Dewey understood Darwinism as involving a commitment to 
causal explanation. Dewey (1894, pp. 338-9) thus responded to the proposition of an 
uncaused ego with the insistence that „it becomes necessary to find a cause for this preference 
of one alternative over the other.‟ He continued: „when I am told that freedom consists in the 
ability of an independent ego to choose between alternatives, and that the reference to the ego 
meets the scientific demand with reference to the principle of causation, I feel as if I were 
being gratuitously fooled with.‟ For Dewey, in full Darwinian spirit, the need for causal 
explanation could not be abandoned. 
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From a Darwinian philosophical perspective, all outcomes have to be explained in a linked 
causal process. There is no teleology or goal in nature. Everything must submit to a causal 
explanation in scientific terms. In his prescient essay on the impact of Darwinism on 
philosophy, John Dewey (1910a, p. 15) wrote: „Interest shifts ... from an intelligence that 
shaped things once for all to the particular intelligences which things are even now shaping‟. 
Instead of God creating everything, the Darwinian focus is on how everything, including 
human intelligence and intentionality, was created through evolution. Intentionality is still 
active and meaningful, but it too has evolved over millions of years. 
In this manner, Dewey abandoned idealist or dualist conceptions of mind. Instead he 
adopted a naturalistic and Darwinian approach where knowledge is considered as an adaptive 
human response to problems posed by the social and natural environment. Instead of 
regarding knowledge as a reflection or representation of reality in thought, Dewey saw 
knowledge as a mental outcome of the ongoing interaction between humans and their 
environment. Knowledge, furthermore, was instrumental to the life-process and survival. 
His naturalistic turn was clear in his famous essay on the „the reflex arc concept‟. There 
Dewey (1896) argued that knowledge could not result simply from the passive reception of 
sense-data, causing a conscious act of awareness and an eventual response. For Dewey (1896, 
pp. 357-8), this view was causally incomplete and inherited faults from mind-body dualism: 
„the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of stimulus 
and response.‟ Instead, he argued for a more interactive conception, where knowledge arises 
from physical interaction with the world. Active manipulation of the environment is 
necessarily involved in the process of learning and knowledge acquisition. 
This essay also provided a critique of one of the assumptions that would later be central to 
behaviorist psychology. For Dewey, the stimulus-response mechanism was flawed because 
stimuli are not given data. The actions and dispositions of the agent are necessary to perceive 
the stimulus. Stimulus and response cannot be separated, because action is necessary to obtain 
a stimulus, and the response invokes further stimuli. Hence „the distinction of sensation and 
movement as stimulus and response respectively is not a distinction which can be regarded as 
descriptive of anything which holds of psychical events or existences as such‟ (Dewey, 1896, 
p. 369). Veblen (1900, pp. 246-7) replicated part of this argument with approval, but without 
mentioning Dewey by name. Dewey developed his naturalist viewpoint in his Studies in 
Logical Theory (1903), acknowledging the strong influence of James. Dewey (1903, p. x) 
argued that 
since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with the like yet 
diverse functions of affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached 
to treat knowing as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory whole … since knowledge 
appears as a function within experience, and it passes judgment upon the processes and 
contents of other functions, its work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or 
transformatory … 
Accordingly, Dewey saw knowledge as part of a psychologically- and naturally-grounded 
process. A key moment is the emergence of a problematic situation, when our habitual 
responses to environmental cues are challenged because they are inadequate for ongoing 
activity. In such circumstances we have to seek some new pattern of action in response to the 
challenge. He stressed in his Studies and subsequent writings that the uncertainty that arises in 
such a problematic situation is not principally cognitive, but also practical and existential. He 
recognized „a level of feeling which does not involve consciousness in any cognitive sense of 
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the term‟ (Tiles, 1988, p. 43). Cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to 
engagement with the problem. 
In the reflective phase of the process, ideas or suppositions are consciously entertained as 
part of possible solutions to the difficulty. But such reflection is not separate from feeling, as 
it too involves emotional excitation. The test of its hypothetical solutions is in practice. If they 
are effective, and fluid activity is restored, then these cognitive elements themselves become 
rooted in further habits or dispositions. 
Dewey wished to avoid the dualistic mistake of regarding the cognitive response as prior to, 
or separate from, the instinctive or habit-driven responses to the situation. He thus broke with 
the tradition in epistemology of isolating the reflective stage of the process, as a primary 
activity of a conscious mind in search of knowledge. Furthermore, he rejected the 
foundationalist view that knowledge can be based on some primary solid grounding, such as 
sense data or reason. Instead, for Dewey, knowledge was the upshot of an ongoing process of 
adaptation to changing experiences. Knowledge is a means for gaining control over our 
environment and bettering our condition. In this schema, all knowledge was provisional, and 
contingent upon its instrumentality for human action. 
In his Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey (1922) elaborated on the role of habit in this 
process. Consistently with James and Veblen, Dewey (p. 42) explained the nature of habit in 
the following terms: „The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of 
response.‟ The use of habit is largely unconscious. Habits are submerged repertoires of 
potential behavior; they can be triggered or reinforced by an appropriate stimulus or context. 
In a manner consistent with his preceding work, he saw the formation of habit as the temporal 
precursor and basis of rational deliberation. Dewey (p. 30) remarked that the „formation of 
ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit.‟ In this pragmatist view, habit supports 
rather than obstructs rational deliberation; without habit reason is impossible (Kilpinen, 1999, 
2000). 
However, Human Nature and Conduct was written at a time when the concept of instinct 
was coming under attack within the scientific community. John B. Watson (1914, 1919) 
announced the new behaviorist psychology, arguing on the basis of animal experiments that 
environmental conditioning was primary and instinct a secondary concept. By 1919 „what had 
been … a sort of rebellious sideshow among the academic psychologists took on the 
dimensions of an intellectual revolution‟ (Kallen, 1930, p. 497). Eventually, Watson and other 
behaviorists entirely abandoned the concept of instinct. The attack became so severe that 
eventually some rejected the notion of any inherited dispositions. The behaviorists alleged 
that consciousness, intention, sensation and introspection were „unscientific‟ concepts because 
they could not be observed directly. They promoted a positivist vision of science and 
concentrated instead on empirically manifest behavior. They disregarded everything that 
could not be directly measured and tested by experiment as unscientific. 
Dewey was not the only writer to be affected by this tide of opinion.7 Dewey (1922, p. 104) 
expressed some reluctance in using the term „instinct‟ and generally switched to the word 
„impulse‟ instead. Where Dewey (1922, pp. 106-9) retained the term „instinct‟ he gave it an 
unclear meaning, even suggesting in one passage that human instincts could change more 
rapidly than social customs or institutions. At the same time, his concept of habit was 
                                                 
7 In Hodgson (2004a) I argue that from the 1920s, with the exception of Veblen and very few others, the rise of 
behaviorist psychology profoundly affected the entire movement in institutional economics. 
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broadened to take up many of the roles that instinct psychologists had previously accorded to 
instincts. In response, the psychologist William McDougall (1924) argued convincingly that 
instincts were still essential to Dewey‟s own argument, and should not be abandoned. Despite 
this shift in his position, Dewey maintained that inherited or acquired „impulses‟, including 
learned habits, were prior to and necessary for deliberative reason. 
Throughout his long career, he defended and refined the idea in his Studies (1903) that 
knowledge was part of a process of acquiring capabilities to interact with the world. While his 
thought went through several phases, this core idea remained. His view remained of 
knowledge as an adaptation to circumstances, and inquiry as „a process of progressive and 
cumulative re-organization of antecedent conditions‟ (Dewey, 1938, p. 246). The volume he 
co-authored with Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (1949), represents a mature 
statement of this position. 
However, the biological and psychological dispositions and mechanisms behind adaptive or 
inquiring behavior progressively disappeared from view. The rapidly waning popularity of 
Jamesian instinct-habit psychology after the First World War made it difficult for Dewey to 
sustain or develop the original psychological parameters of his argument concerning 
knowledge. In his Logic, Dewey (1938, p. 143) still wrote of knowledge as „mediated through 
certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit‟ but neither „instinct‟ or „impulse‟ appear 
in the index of that work. In Knowing and the Known, not only is the concept of instinct 
absent, but also habit plays an insignificant role. Well before 1949, Dewey had seemingly 
abandoned instinct-habit psychology. 
Pragmatist philosophy also suffered a decline in popularity, particularly after the rise of 
logical positivism in the 1930s. The situation is very different today, however. The concept of 
instinct is now re-established in psychology (Degler, 1991; Plotkin, 1994) and pragmatism 
has eventually re-emerged to become „if not the most influential, at least one of the fastest 
growing philosophical frameworks on the intellectual landscape‟ (Hands, 2001, p. 214). This 
makes Dewey‟s contribution especially relevant today. 
However, the interpretation of Dewey is not all plain sailing. Elias Khalil (2003a, 2003b) 
has proposed that the „transactional‟ theory of action that Dewey developed in the 1930s and 
1940s involves the transcendence of the duality between subject and object, whereas 
Darwinism is defective in this regard. He thus suggests a tension between the (Darwinian) 
early Dewey, and Dewey after 1930. It is beyond the scope of this essay to establish whether 
not such a contradiction exists in Dewey‟s work. I simply point to the danger of conflating 
subject and object (or structure). Such a conflation is evidenced in a tradition of writers, from 
Cooley (1922) to Anthony Giddens (1984), who both described actor and structure as aspects 
of a single process. Such a conflation is undermined by the fact that the external world 
(including human society) must exist before any human individual. This observation – made 
by Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, George Henry Lewes and many others long ago – undermines 
the symmetry and conflation of actor and structure, and points to processual, morphogenetic 
or evolutionary modes of theorizing (Archer, 1995; Hodgson, 2004a). If Dewey did indeed 
abandon these Darwinian insights then this would be evidence for some regress, rather than 
unambiguous progress, in his thought. 
4. Friedrich Hayek 
Born more than 40 years after Dewey and Veblen, and brought up in Europe rather than 
America, Hayek came from a very different intellectual environment, in both time and space. 
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Much of his work was accomplished in the period from the 1920s to the 1960s, when 
behaviorist psychology was in the ascendant, the concept of instinct was out of favor, and the 
importation of evolutionary ideas from biology into the social sciences was unpopular. 
Despite this, he developed an early critique of behaviorism in his Sensory Order (1952), when 
behaviorism in some quarters was at its apogee. 
Both Hayek and Dewey died in their ninety-third year, each leaving a huge corpus of work, 
manifesting several distinct phases of intellectual development. In the case of Dewey, the 
influence of Darwinism reached its zenith in his early writings. In the case of Hayek, the 
connection with evolutionary biology became strongest in his mature works, from 1958 until 
1988. Despite Hayek‟s (1942, p. 269) earlier critique of „slavish imitation of the method and 
language‟ of the natural sciences, in his later works Hayek (1958, 1960, 1967) began to apply 
Darwinian ideas to social evolution, noting both similarities and differences with biological 
evolution. 
The central concept in Hayek‟s mature theory of social evolution is that of a rule. Hayek 
(1973, p. 11) wrote: „Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one.‟ 
Although Hayek makes occasional reference to the concepts of habit and instinct – his 
treatment of which I shall discuss below – the pre-eminent concept of „rule‟ in his mature 
work often acts as a surrogate or substitute for these psychological conceptions. Hayek (1967, 
pp. 66-7) wrote: 
it should be clearly understood that the term „rule‟ is used for a statement by which a 
regularity of the conduct of individuals can be described, irrespective of whether such a 
rule is „known‟ to the individuals in any other sense than they normally act in 
accordance with it. 
Hayek (1979, pp. 159-60) went on to explore the varied origins and „layers of rules‟ in human 
society. The lowest layer consisted of rules derived from the „little changing foundation of 
genetically inherited, “instinctive” drives‟. Higher layers involved rules that were not 
deliberately chosen or designed but had evolved in society, and rules that were consciously 
designed and inaugurated. For Hayek, therefore, a rule is any behavioral disposition, 
including instincts and habits, which can lead to „a regularity of the conduct of individuals‟. 
Despite his longstanding opposition to behaviorism, Hayek‟s definition of a rule has some 
behaviorist features. While behaviorism eschewed matters of consciousness and intent, Hayek 
generally neglected matters of conscious knowledge of, or intent in following, any rule. 
Roland Kley (1994, p. 44) has rightly criticized Hayek‟s inclusion of instincts in his overly 
broad definition of a rule: 
Hayek flatly equates rule-following with behavioural regularity ... Such a conception of 
rule-following is far too broad. It commits Hayek, for example, to regard all regular 
bodily functions as resulting from the observance of rules. But obviously the pulsation 
of the heart or regular eyelid movements are not instances of rule-following. 
This focus on the broadly-defined rule as such, rather than its origin or impetus, was the 
starting point for Hayek‟s theory of social evolution. Accordingly, Hayek neglected the 
grounding of such „rules‟ in habits or instincts. Instead, in a series of works Hayek (1958, 
1960, 1967, 1973, 1979, 1988) progressively developed an explanation of the selection of 
social rules through the selection of the fitter social groups. For Hayek (1973, p. 9) 
institutions and practices, which had first „been adopted for other reasons, or even purely 
accidentally, were preserved because they enable the group in which they had arisen to prevail 
over others.‟ 
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The further details of this evolutionary account need not concern us here, as we are 
primarily concerned with Hayek‟s treatment of instinct and habit, and their relation to 
deliberation and reason. But we should already be alerted to the problem that his account 
lacks an adequate explanation of the origin and impetus behind rules themselves. Because he 
lacked such a causal story, his explanation is insufficiently Darwinian. 
What sustains the rule and gives it some durability through time? Hayek did not give us a 
sufficiently clear answer, but in discussing the process of cultural transmission he put 
emphasis on the role of imitation (Hayek, 1967, pp. 46-8; 1979, pp. 155-7; 1988, pp. 21, 24). 
This might help to explain how behavioral regularities are reproduced but we still lack a 
causal explanation of imitation and rule-following itself. What are the mechanisms involved 
in the genesis of action: the transformation of a rule into an act? Hayek (1967, p. 69) wrote 
vaguely of the „external stimulus‟ and the „internal drive‟, without giving us much more to go 
on. There is another unfilled gap in his theory. Hayek did not emphasize the instinctive 
foundation of imitative capacities. 
Hayek argued that the possibility of rule replication through imitation accounts for the 
much faster rate of cultural evolution, compared with the sluggish biotic processes of genetic 
change and selection. Genetic evolution, Hayek (1988, p. 16) rightly argued, is „far too slow‟ 
to account for the rapid development of civilization. Instead, new practices were spread by 
imitation and acquired habit. This is a valid argument concerning the nature of cultural 
evolution but it still does not provide us with an adequate causal story. 
Turning specifically to Hayek‟s conception of instinct, the term is not prominent in his 
work. Even his overtly psychological volume, The Sensory Order, has a developed theory of 
neither instinct nor habit. Hayek therein wrote occasionally of impulses, and referred briefly 
to the work of James, but he did not discuss at length the nature, origin and replication of the 
mental dispositions that frame and connect incoming neural stimuli. He was more concerned 
to show that the physical and the neural orders in the brain are not isomorphic, and thus the 
mental could not be reduced to the physical. Hayek (1952, p. 53) wrote of „physiological 
memory‟ as being the means by which „the physiological impulses are converted into 
sensations. The connexions between the physiological elements are thus the primary 
phenomenon which creates the mental phenomena.‟ The ultimate purpose of the argument, 
while rejecting dualism as such, was to establish „that for practical purposes we shall always 
have to adopt a dualistic view‟, consequently „we shall never be able to bridge the gap 
between physical and mental phenomena‟ (Hayek, p. 179). Despite the far-sighted and 
prescient character of this work, it essentially protected a dualism „for practical purposes‟ 
from the behaviorist reduction of mind to behavior.8 
Even as Hayek developed his evolutionary account of social change, the concept of instinct 
did not become prominent because it was subsumed under his overly copious concept of rule. 
Hayek (1960, pp. 40, 60; 1988, p. 17) described some instincts in negative terms, as 
„ferocious‟ or „beastly‟, and as „more adapted to the life of a hunter than to life in 
civilization‟. Hayek (1979, p. 165; 1988, p. 12) also wrote of „instincts of solidarity and 
altruism‟ linked to a „yearning for egalitarianism and collectivism‟ appropriate for the 
solidaristic small groups in hunter-gather societies. 
                                                 
8 There is one reference to Dewey in Hayek‟s (1952, p, 176) work, where he mistakenly attributes to James and 
Dewey a view that sensations are the „ultimate constituents of the world‟. 
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This normative treatment of instincts is used to support predictably Hayekian normative 
conclusions. Hayek (1979, p. 161; 1988, pp. 16-17) argued that „practically all advance had to 
be achieved by infringing or repressing some of the innate rules and replacing them by new 
ones which made the co-ordination of larger groups possible‟ and this „gradual replacement of 
innate responses by learnt rules increasingly distinguished man from other animals‟. In the 
group of undesirable impulses requiring repression, Hayek includes not only our allegedly 
instinctive beastliness and ferocity, but also our „atavistic‟ instincts for „egalitarianism and 
collectivism‟, which he deems unsuited for modern, complex, civilized society. According to 
Hayek, civilization advances by the repression of several instincts. Hayek thus continues in 
the tradition of Cuvier and Durkheim, in contrast to that of Darwin, of regarding human 
progress and the use of instinct as inversely correlated.  
Although contestable, this was a powerful rhetorical move. Hayek first capitalized on the 
generally negative attitude towards the concept of instinct in much of twentieth-century social 
science. Second he argued – in line with the long rationalistic tradition of distrust for our 
impulses and emotions – that civilization must involve the repression of many of our instincts. 
So far, he was in the company of many. Then, third, he turned this argument against the 
political left, by proclaiming – without evidence – that collectivist sentiments are residues of 
our primitive past, and inappropriate for the individualism that must be foundation of a free 
and civilized society. However, despite his powerful rhetoric, Hayek ignored a very different 
explanation of the twentieth-century impetus towards collectivism. As Joseph Schumpeter 
(1942, p. 143) and several others maintained, socialism might alternatively be regarded as 
modern liberal ideology run to rationalistic and egalitarian extremes. 
As Charles Leathers (1990, p. 175) wrote: „Both Veblen and Hayek made normative uses of 
instincts, but in a very different fashion.‟ In contrast to Hayek, Veblen identified some 
instincts, notably the „instinct of workmanship‟ and the „parental bent‟ as not only being 
highly positive and worthwhile, but also standards of progress in themselves. However, 
normative issues are not my prime concern here. What is clear is that in their contrasting uses 
of the concept of instinct, Veblen and Hayek had very different understandings of the nature 
of instinct itself. While Veblen saw instincts as a necessary foundation for all thought and 
behavior, Hayek limited his discussion of these inherited impulses, and never acknowledged 
their indispensable role in human cognition and action. In particular, while Veblen saw reason 
as itself requiring instinct to function, Hayek saw reason and instinct as mutually exclusive 
rather than complementary, and often at odds with each other. 
Hayek‟s treatment of habit is similarly problematic. Again the concept is not prominent, 
because it is also subsumed within his overly extensive concept of a „rule‟. In addition, unlike 
Veblen and Dewey, Hayek failed to acknowledge that habit and reason can be complements. 
Hence in one passage Hayek (1958, p. 239) wrote of being „guided by habit rather than 
reflection‟ as if they were generally antagonistic sources of behavior. Another passage where 
Hayek (1973, p. 11) referred to habit is as follows: 
Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful 
pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which 
have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view. 
Here Hayek argued that institutions result in part from habits and customs, and in turn these 
institutions are conditions for conscious action. But Hayek neither established a direct link 
from habit to intention, nor recognized that habit is a necessary foundation for conscious 
reflection itself. Furthermore, his rather casual use of the term here suggests a conception of 
habit as settled behavior, more than a propensity or disposition. 
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In his last book, Hayek (1988, p. 23) argued that „custom and tradition stand between 
instinct and reason – logically, psychologically, temporally.‟ This is the closest he gets to 
acknowledging the instinctive foundation of reason. His former association of custom with 
habit would place both in the intermediate position. But while he connected instinct, custom 
and reason, he failed to establish them as complementary with one another. While Hayek 
(1988, p. 21) ably criticized the notion that „the ability to acquire skills comes from reason‟ he 
did not address the foundations and evolutionary origins of reason itself.9 
Overall, Hayek subsumes both habit and instinct within his excessively general concept of a 
rule, thus neglecting the cognitive and psychological foundations of rules themselves. What is 
partly required is an explanation why people do, or do not, follow rules. Pointing to the 
incentives and sanctions associated with rules is insufficient because it would not explain how 
individuals evaluate the sanctions or incentives involved. We also have to explain why they 
might, or might not, take incentives or sanctions seriously. 
Clearly, the mere codification, legislation or proclamation of a rule are insufficient to make 
that rule effect social behavior. It might simply be ignored, just as many French ignore legal 
restrictions on smoking in restaurants, and drivers everywhere break speed limits on roads. In 
this respect, the unqualified term „rule‟ may mislead us. What matters in the construction of 
institutions are systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social 
interactions, rather than the formal structure of rules as such. Furthermore, it is only through 
an understanding of the role of instinct and habit that we can show how rules are followed, 
become established and attain durability. 
Although Hayek made repeated reference to Darwin, especially in his mature works, he 
treated Darwinism as a continuation of earlier evolutionary ideas, which depended less on 
variation and selection. Hayek (1978, p. 265) alleged that others „made the idea of evolution a 
commonplace in the social sciences of the nineteenth century long before Darwin.‟ Hayek 
(1973, p. 23) insisted on the existence of „Darwinians before Darwin‟. With such statements 
he repeatedly underestimated the substance and impact of the Darwinian Revolution 
(Hodgson, 1993, 2004b). Although Hayek‟s development of evolutionary theory in the social 
sciences is highly significant, its Darwinian component is incomplete. In particular, and 
unlike Veblen and Dewey, Hayek failed to appreciate the impact of Darwinian thinking on the 
treatment of human mind and intentionality. 
5. Conclusion: Veblen, Dewey and Hayek in the Light of Modern Research 
This broadly chronological treatment of the views of Veblen, Dewey and Hayek on the 
question of instinct, habit and reason raises the old question as to whether science really or 
always makes cumulative progress. Of the three, Dewey was the most sophisticated 
philosopher. But in Veblen‟s writing the implications of Darwinism and Jamesian psychology 
were driven most deeply into the philosophical core of the social sciences. If Veblen had had 
the energy and longevity of Dewey or Hayek, one wonders what he might have achieved. But 
Veblen‟s legacy has been constrained by his generally elliptic and often cryptic writing style, 
                                                 
9 See Murphy (1994) for an illuminating discussion of the complementarities of instinct, habit and reason. 
Murphy (1994, p. 538) concluded: „Hayek, like the Sophists, treats his concepts as mutually exclusive 
alternatives (nature or custom or stipulation), whereas Aristotle treats his concepts as complementary and 
mutually inclusive (nature and custom and stipulation).‟ 
 - 20 - 
and the concentration of his most innovative theoretical output largely within the few years 
from 1898 to 1914.10 By contrast both Dewey and Hayek both continued to produce ground-
breaking work for half a century or more. However, the modern literature suggests that the 
Veblenian stance is more in line with current research in psychology and philosophy. 
The revival of pragmatist philosophy and the emergence of evolutionary psychology are 
relevant in this context. In his modern reconstruction of pragmatist thought, Hans Joas (1996, 
p. 158) succinctly summarized its contribution in this area: 
The alternative to a teleological interpretation of action, with its inherent dependence on 
Cartesian dualisms, is to conceive of perception and cognition not as preceding action but 
rather as a phase of action by which action is directed and redirected in its situational 
contexts. According to this alternative view, goal-setting does not take place by an act of 
intellect prior to the actual action, but is instead the result of a reflection on aspirations 
and tendencies that are pre-reflexive and have already always been operative. In this act 
of reflection, we thematize aspirations which are normally at work without our being 
actively aware of them. But where exactly are these aspirations located? They are located 
in our bodies. It is the body‟s capabilities, habits and ways of relating to its environment 
which form the background to all conscious goal-setting, in other words, to our 
intentionality. Intentionality itself, then, consists in a self-reflective control which we 
exercise over our current behavior. 
This pragmatist conception of action is entirely consistent with the views of both Veblen and 
Dewey. However, while Dewey always stressed that cognition was embedded in process and 
circumstances, Veblen was more consistent in seeing habit and instinct as the necessary 
foundations of intention and reason. Remarkably, with developments in modern psychology 
and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s, the Veblenian approach on instincts and habits now 
seems remarkably modern. For instance, Howard Margolis (1987, p. 29) has pursued the 
hierarchy of instinct, habit and reason in the following terms: 
The output of the brain ... would then consist of some blending of instinct, habit, and 
judgment, all subject to errors and limitations, but on the whole sufficient to make the 
brain capable of survival in the environment in which it operates. There is a natural 
hierarchy in the three modes (instinct, habit, judgment). Habits must be built out of 
instincts, judgment must somehow derive from instinct and habits. 
The idea that that reason is in part a manifestation of instinct, and that instinct and reason are 
complements, has again found its time a century after James and Veblen. Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby (1994b, p. 330) wrote of „reasoning instincts‟ and Henry Plotkin (1994, p. 165) 
has explained that: 
Rationality and intelligence are extensions of instinct and can never be separated from it. 
The doctrine of separate determination is completely wrong. ... Instinct is the mother of 
intelligence. 
Instinct is not the antithesis of reason, but one of its preconditions. By freeing the conscious 
mind from many details, instincts and habits have an essential role. If we had to deliberate 
upon everything, our reasoning would be paralyzed by the weight of data. 
                                                 
10 See Hodgson (2004a, 2004c) for discussions and possible explanations of Veblen‟s waning creativity. 
 - 21 - 
Modern evolutionary psychologists have provided evidence that human rational capacities 
are improved when logical rules are placed in a social context. Our minds are more tuned to 
socially contextualized rules than to abstract logical reasoning. Accordingly, our knowledge 
makes use of „modular‟ intelligence or „fast and frugal‟ heuristics, rather than extended, 
intricate computations that consume as much as possible of the available information.11 
Cosmides and Tooby (1994a, p. 68) argued that human intentionality must be studied in an 
evolutionary context: „The human brain did not fall out of the sky, an inscrutable artefact of 
unknown origin, and there is no longer any sensible reason for studying it in ignorance of the 
causal processes that constructed it.‟ This has led to a critique of prevailing versions of 
rationality and intentionality in the social sciences. Among these is the separation of thought 
from its neural and material context. As Denise Cummins (1998, p. 31) put it: „The Cartesian 
fantasy is that mind is pure intellect, the engagement in pure thought for its own sake. But 
evolution doesn‟t work that way.‟ 
Cosmides and Tooby (1994b, p. 327) rejected the widespread assumption „that rational 
behavior is the state of nature, requiring no explanation.‟ They went on to criticize what they 
call the Standard Social Science Model, where the mind harbors general cognitive processes 
that are „context-independent‟ or „context-free‟. The key argument in this modern literature is 
that postulates concerning the rational capacities of the human brain must give an explanation 
of their evolution according to established Darwinian principles of evolutionary biology 
(Cummins and Allen, 1998). 
Many of the ideas of the early pragmatists and instinct psychologists have today made a 
comeback. „Modern research has tended to lessen the priority of the conscious, deliberating 
aspect of the mind‟ (Twomey, 1998, p. 441). Accordingly, Antonio Damasio (1994) has 
undermined the Cartesian barrier between body and mind, and accordingly between 
intentional and materialist causality. The phenomenon of the mind cannot be understood from 
the functioning of the brain alone. Mind and reason are both also inseparable from the body 
and its environment (Clark, 1997a, 1997b). This environment includes the institutions within 
which people act. Beliefs and intentions are, in part, formed and changed through interactions 
with others (Lane et al. 1996). We think and act in and through the contexts of our activities. 
The idea of the human will as the ultimate, context-independent source of all intention and 
belief is untenable. 
Paul Twomey has explored in detail the parallels between Veblen‟s „economic psychology‟ 
and much of modern psychology and cognitive science. The perspective that Veblen inherited 
from Peirce, James and others „stressed the active and multi-tiered nature of the mind in 
which instincts, habits, and conscious reasoning are all significant for understanding human 
behaviour‟ (Twomey, 1998, p. 437).  
Any attempt to define rationality in an entirely context-independent manner is inadequate. 
In an ongoing process, people act, perceive, reason, make decisions, and act again. We try to 
do our best with our knowledge in the circumstances. But the cognitive frames and criteria, 
which they use in their perceptions and deliberations, necessarily precede and mould the 
reasoning process. Rationality itself depends on prior social and psychological props. „Mind 
first‟ explanations fail to acknowledge this. 
                                                 
11 See Buss (1999), Cosmides and Tooby (1994a, 1994b), Cummins (1998), Gigerenzer et al. (1999), Plotkin 
(1994, 1997), Potts (2003), Sperber (1996), Todd and Gigerenzer (2000), Weingart et al. (1997). 
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Even within mainstream economics, where hard core notions of rationality have long been 
protected from critical attack, there are recent signs of a move in this direction. Work by 
experimental economists is increasingly being interpreted as establishing the importance of 
the institutional and cultural context of decision-making (Loomes, 1999; Smith, 2003). The 
new subdiscipline of „neuroeconomics‟ abandons Cartesian dualism and attempts to ground 
rational deliberation and choice on neurological and biological mechanisms (Glimcher, 2003; 
Zak, 2004; Camerer et al., 2005). 
It is not the notion that humans act for reasons that is being attacked here. Humans do act 
for reasons – but reasons and beliefs themselves are caused, and have to be explained. It is 
proposed here that reasoning itself is based on habits and instincts, and it cannot be sustained 
without them. Furthermore, consistent with the evolutionary doctrine of continuity, these 
instincts and the capacities to form habits, all developed through a process of natural selection 
that extends way back into our pre-human past. 
It might be objected that there is more to human purposefulness than goal-driven behavior. 
After all, ants and robots are purposeful in that limited sense. A key point about social 
interactions is that we gauge and impute the intentions of others, in order to understand and 
anticipate their behavior. Social action is intersubjective and reflexive. It is very much about 
meanings, interpretations of meaning, and imputations of meaning to the behavior of others. 
Regrettably, some enthusiasts of Darwin have overlooked these issues. But there is nothing in 
Darwinism that rules out their inclusion. On the contrary, if interpretations of meaning and 
intention are causally efficacious, then there is a Darwinian imperative to understand their 
role. Furthermore, the capacities to think, interact and interpret have themselves evolved and 
must also be understood in evolutionary terms (Bogdan, 1997, 2000). 
It is indeed remarkable that a view of the human mind, strongly prompted by Darwin and 
developed by James, Veblen and others, has returned prominence in philosophy and 
psychology. It is the Darwinian framing of these ideas that has been shown to be enduring. 
Before we move on, we ought to recognize the contributions of the Darwinian pioneers of 
more than a century ago, some of which have been inadequately acknowledged. 
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